Individual heterogeneity plays a key role in explaining variation in self-reported well-being and, in particular, health satisfaction. It is hypothesised that the inuence of this heterogeneity varies over levels of health and increases over the life-cycle. These hypotheses are tested with data on health satisfaction from 22 waves of the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP). Nonlinear xed eects methods that allow for unobserved heterogeneity are not readily available for categorical measures of well-being. One common solution is to revert to conditional xed eects methods, at the price of a high degree of information loss. Another common solution is to ignore the association between unobserved heterogeneity and socio-economic status by using pooled or random eects models, at the price of potential bias. We use a generalization of the conditional xed eects logit, that allows for individual-specic reporting bias, heterogeneity in health endowments, and heterogeneity in the impact of income on health satisfaction. Adjusting for unobserved heterogeneity accounts for the relationship between income and very good health, but not between income and poorer health states. The income gradient for older age-groups is more strongly aected by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity: revealing an increasing inuence of heterogeneity on health satisfaction over the life-span.
Individual heterogeneity plays a major role in determining self-reported life and health satisfaction. Evidence from the psychological literature suggests that 50 to 80 percent of the variation in happiness should be attributed to genetics, personality traits, and or early childhood experiences (Lykken and Tellegen, 1996) . The question is whether the link between life satisfaction and observable factors such as ination (DiTella et al., 2001 (DiTella et al., , 2003 Helliwell, 2004; Alesina et al., 2004) , unemployment (Clark and Oswald, 1994; Clark, 2001; Winkelmann and Winkelmann, 1998) , income growth (Easterlin, 1995; Blanchower and Oswald, 2004) or relative income (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Frijters et al., 2004a Frijters et al., , 2006 Lelkes, 2006; Boes and Winkelmann, 2006) can be assessed reliably in the presence of confounding latent variables? How reliable are subjective well-being indicators for predicting economic outcomes or the willingness-to-pay for a public good (Oswald, 1997; Layard, 2005; Frey et al., 2006; Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; Kahnemann and Krueger, 2006)? 1 Similar questions arise in the study of the relationship between socio-economic status and health satisfaction, the latter being a constituent part of overall life satisfaction (Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004) . Health satisfaction can be understood as an alternative measure to self-assessed health which is often considered to be a reliable predictor of mortality (Mossey and Shapiro, 1982; Idler and Benyamini, 1997; Mackenbach et al., 2002) . The literature on the socio-economic gradient of health provides extensive evidence that an association between these variables exists, but both the causal pathways and the factors that explain this association remain controversial. Thus, as for overall well-being, we need to ask how much of the variation of health status is driven by latent factors such as health-related genetics and personality traits and by how much do these correlate with socio-economic status. For example, in the context of health, an interesting candidate for the composition of the unobserved eect is cognitive ability, a factor widely acknowledged by labour economists, that biases wage regressions if left unaccounted for (Card, 1995; Blackburn and Neumark, 1995) .
The link between cognitive ability and socio-economic status has been well documented. For instance, children's IQ predicts adult socio-economic outcome better than parents' background variables (Jencks et al., 1972 (Jencks et al., , 1979 and 20 to 40 percent of total observed variation in education, occupation, and earnings can be linked to genetic dierences in cognitive ability (Gottfredson, 2004) . In health economics cognitive ability has not yet received similar attention. One exception is Auld and Sidhu (2005) who show that both schooling and cognitive ability are strongly associated with lower health status and that intelligence accounts for about one quarter of the association between schooling and health. There is also evidence that general intelligence is a very good predictor of health outcomes (Gottfredson, 1997 (Gottfredson, , 2002 Gottfredson and Deary, 2004 ). Children's IQ is also a reliable predictor of survival rates in older age (Whalley and 1 A comprehensive and excellent review of the literature is provided by Clark et al. (2006) . Deary, 2001; Betty and Deary, 2004) . Singh-Manoux et al. (2005) conclude that up to 40 percent of the relationship between socio-economic status and self-rated health can be explained by cognitive ability.
Several non-exclusive explanations for the association between IQ and objective and subjective health indicators have been advanced. On the one hand, IQ could be considered a good proxy for health, representing birth complications, suboptimal postnatal care or general body integrity measured via the brain's capacity to process information rapidly and accurately. On the other hand, IQ may be an indirect proxy for health behaviour with respect to substance abuse, stress management or adherence to complex treatment regimes.
Moreover, the inuence of unobserved heterogeneity on health and well-being may not necessarily remain constant over the life-span of an individual. The idea of dynamic heterogeneity has been expressed by Frijters et al. (2005a) in the context of a mixed proportional hazard model. They assume unobserved heterogeneity to grow over time due to cumulating experiences of random health shocks. In our paper, we hypothesise that the inuence of unobserved heterogeneity on health and socio-economic outcomes changes nonlinearly over the life-cycle. We justify this hypothesis by several arguments. First, Scarr and McCartney (1983) argue in a theoretical paper on individual development that genetic factors become more inuential in determining choices in older age. This has to do with the fact that once leaving the nurturing environment of family and compulsory schooling, individuals engage in niche-building that correlates with their talents, interests, and personality characteristics. Hence, choices determining socio-economic status (tertitary schooling, professional training, on-the-job training) and health behaviours (diet, smoking, exercise), correlates more strongly with unobserved factors such as intelligence in adulthood. To this extent, we would expect younger age-groups to exhibit less bias when not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore, genetic factors play an even stronger role when the limits of life-span (above 80) are reached (McClearn et al., 1997; Perls, 2002) . To be able to surpass a specic age, individuals must be endowed with a genetically determined health status that helps them to suppress age-related diseases and, thus, increase life expectancy. In this respect, we would expect the oldest age-group to exhibit the greatest level of bias when not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Second, it has been shown that genetic factors increasingly determine individual dierences in cognitive ability across age-groups (20 percent in childhood, 40 percent in adolescence, and 50 to 60 percent in adulthood) (McGue et al., 1993; Plomin, 1986; Plomin and Petrill, 1997; Bouchard, 1998) . If cognitive ability proxies physical and mental functioning, then the link between unobserved heterogeneity and health outcomes should increase over the life-time as well. Third, health status generally worsens over the life-cycle due to idiosyncratic health shocks, age-related diseases and the outbreak of particular genetic diseases (Liang et al., 2005) .
In light of these arguments, the appropriate econometric model to assess the socio-economic gradient of health satisfaction should capture the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and its correlation with socio-economic factors. Fixed-eects panel data methods, that allow for a correlation between unobserved heterogeneity and the regressors of the model, are not, however, readily available for categorical ordered data due to what is called the "incidental parameter problem" (Neyman and Scott, 1948) . To assess self-reported health data researchers have adopted two common approaches. Studies in the happiness literature typically revert to conditional xed eects methods, originally proposed by Chamberlain (1980) . Although this provides consistent parameter estimates, even when the individual eect correlates with the regressors, the approach causes a range of practical inconveniences for the researcher. First, the approach incurs a great loss of information and a reduction in sample size. This is because the dependent variable needs to be collapsed into a binary format. Empirical studies usually use an arbitrary threshold value so that only those individuals can be retained in the sample who surpass this threshold. Second, marginal eects of a variable of interest cannot be easily calculated due to the inherent lack of information on the distribution of the individual heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2002, p.492) . A recent extension of Chamberlain's model, the conditional ordered xed eects logit (COFEL), proposed by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) and applied by Frijters et al. (2004a Frijters et al. ( ,b, 2005b , suggests a method to reduce the drastic loss in the number of observations by identifying individual-specic threshold values to collapse the dependent variable into a binary format. However, its original formulation is highly computation intensive, a fact which makes its wider application less attractive. In a simplication of this estimator, one can simply use the individual means as cut-o criterion. This approach has the limitation that it still collapses the dependent variable into a binary format and that one can only assess the probability to report a health status greater than one's own mean. This focus may be of limited practical value if the researcher is interested in testing whether the impact of income on health (well-being) diers for high and low values of health (well-being).
In light of these problems many researchers give up the orthogonality assumption or ignore the presence of an individual unobserved eect to be able to apply the conventional models for categorically ordered data. Pooled ordered, generalized ordered (Terza, 1985) or random eects ordered models and their extensions based on the 'correlated eects' approach of Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980) are used predominantly in the literature on self-reported health. Generalized ordered probit models, which relax the single index assumption, are applied in the health literature to control for reporting bias in the subjective measures (Kerkhofs and Lindeboom, 1995; Groot, 2000; Sadana et al., 2000; Shmueli, 2002; Van Doorslaer and Jones, 2003; Hernandez-Quevedo et al., 2004; Contoyannis et al., 2004) . A further extension, the random eects ordered probit model with a dynamic specication has been applied by Jones et al. (2006) to assess health-related panel attrition and by Gannon (2005) to assess the eect of disability on labour market status. Boes and Winkelmann (2006) use generalized ordered probit models to identify the asymmetric impact of income on life satisfaction.
In this paper we use 22 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel to answer four questions concerning the income-health nexus: First, we ask whether the trade-o between parameter bias, that occurs when using ordered or random eects models, and information loss, that occurs when using conditional xed eects logit models, matters. Second, we ask whether the impact of income on health is asymmetric for transitions out of poor health and transitions into very good health. To this extent we go a step further than Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) by proposing a simple solution to overcome the loss of information. In what we call the generalized conditional xed eects logit (GCFEL), we estimate for each possible cut-o value for which the dependent variable can be dichotomized a simple conditional xed eects logit. This allows us to investigate the eect of income on the upper and lower bounds of the distribution of reported health states while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Third, we test the hypothesis that the dierences between marginal eects of income across models vary across age-cohorts.
We do this to take into account the changing inuence of unobserved heterogeneity over the life-cycle. In so far as unobserved factors become more important for the older groups we expect smaller dierences in the relative performance of models for the younger age-groups. Finally, to check for robustness, we ask whether dierences in marginal eects result can be attributed to dierent sample sizes that result from conditional xed and random eects models, from the particular choice of the proxy for health or from the computational methods.
We nd that adjusting for unobserved heterogeneity accounts for the relationship between income and very good health, but not between income and poorer health states. The income gradient for older age-groups is more strongly aected by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity: revealing an increasing inuence of heterogeneity on health satisfaction over the life-span.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces a general panel data specication for ordered categorical data and the methods to calculate marginal eects in the presence of individual heterogeneity. In section 3 we introduce the dataset, explain the construction of the measure of satisfaction with health, present the relevant descriptive statistics, and display the conditional distributions of the dependent variable. In section 4 we present our results. We focus on a graphical depiction of the marginal eects of income and their condence intervals and a simulation of predicted probabilities. This section is complemented by a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of our results. Section 5 concludes and discusses the implications of the results.
Econometric Specication

The Model
We work with an ordered dependent variable that measures health status (HS) as reported by the interviewee 2 . HS * it , the true, but unobserved health status of an individual is given by:
where i = 1, . . . , N , t = 1, . . . , T i , and T i reects an unbalanced panel, α i is an intercept term that varies for individuals and thus represents unobserved heterogeneity, X it is a vector of exogenous variables, and u it is an idiosyncratic error term. We assume u it ∼ Λ(0, π 2 3 ). We observe the reported health status HS it = j for j ∈ {1, . . . , J} if the true, underlying health status lies within an interval τ j−1 and τ j :
We allow the individual threshold value τ j to be not only a function of observable characteristics X it according to Terza (1985) , but also to vary across individuals i:
whereτ ij is a scalar that varies across thresholds j and individuals i and γ j is a 1 × k row vector of response specic parameters. Plugging equation (3) into (2) and replacing HS * it by the linear index of equation (1), then HS it = j if
By rearrangement, we obtain:
where β j = (β − γ j ) and α ij = (α i −τ ij ) . This means that neither β and γ j nor α i , the individual specic health endowment andτ ij , the reporting bias, can be separately identied. Hence, the probability that an individual will report a specic health status HS it = j is
where F = Λ(.) is the logistic distribution function. The sample loglikelihood function to be maximized is:
Equation (9) presents a generalization of Terza (1985) with individual eectsτ ij in the cut-points τ i .
The threshold values allow for individual specic reporting bias due to cut-point shift. Economically, this could mean that individuals in a higher category of perceived health experience a smaller marginal eect of income on health and that the individual unobserved heterogeneity not only diers across individuals, but depends also on the current health status which an individual reports.
In practice, the generalized model dichotomizes the dependent variable for J−1 threshold values that an individual can surpass and estimates the probability of observing HS B,j it = 1. This can be expressed as:
where j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and B stands for "binary variable". Which regression model should be applied depends on the assumption one imposes on the α ij and β j ,
In light of our theoretical discussion on the possible links between health, cognitive ability, and socioeconomic status, we allow α ij to be correlated with the regressors X it . In this setting we can use the Chamberlain (1980) conditional xed eects logit to estimate the β j s. To eliminate the individual xed eect from the loglikelihood function, this approach takes advantage of a sucient statistic. We have to nd J−1 sucient statistics η j for α ij , for which the distribution of the sample, given η j , does not depend on α ij :
In the case of the logistic regression, Andersen (1970 Andersen ( , 1971 shows that Ti t=1 HS B,j it is a sucient statistic for α ij and that conditional ML estimates are consistent. We use this result for J−1 binary equations.
Conditioning on
and 0 otherwise, the loglikelihood is in our case:
where
is the set of all possible sequences of 0s and 1s for which the sum of T i binary outcomes equals Ti t=1 d itj = c j . For those individuals for which 0 < Ti t=1 HS B,j it < T i does not hold true do not contribute to the log-likelihood and, therefore, will be dropped from the sample. Hence, sample sizes N j across the J−1 categories will dier, i.e. N j=1 = . . . = N j=J−1 . In total, there will be T i − 1 alternative sets B ij . Thus, in the denominator of the conditional likelihood function we nd the sum of probabilities of each possible sequence of 0s and 1s that is not equal to 0 or T i . This formulation is a generalization of Chamberlain (1980) , Das and Van Soest (1999) , and Ferreri-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) . All three allow only for dichotomization of one pairing of adjacent categories, and, thus implicitly assume that β j = β and α ij = α i .
Application of the Chamberlain (1980) approach requires an arbitrary threshold to dichotomize the variable, e.g. Ti t=1 I(HS it > 3). Choosing this arbitrary threshold value incurs a loss of those individuals who never cross, at least once, the the threshold j= 3, i.e. for whom 0 < T i t=1 HS B,j=3 it < T i does not hold true. Das and Van Soest (1999) combine adjacent categories so that the dependent variable is summarized as a binary variable, and then use Chamberlain's method. They repeat this for all the possible combinations of adjacent categories to get J−1 estimates of the parameters of interest. Das and Van Soest (1999) then combine these estimates into one nal estimate β F IX which is a linear combination of J−1 β j s. The optimal weighting matrix is obtained from a minimum distance approach. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) propose an estimator that still collapses the ordered variable into a binary format, but that uses an individual specic threshold value j i . To nd this individual threshold, the authors maximize a weighted sum of J−1 log-likelihood functions, similar to Das and Van Soest (1999) , subject to the constraint that the sum of squared weights across all possible threshold values across all individuals must be equal to the number of individuals in the sample. This constraint means that we can use only weights w ij ∈ {0, 1}. This is tantamount to saying that only one out of J−1 log-likelihood functions for each individual actually contributes to the total log-likelihood, all the others will drop out. The major question of this set-up is to which of the J−1 log-likelihood functions should one assign the weight. Ferreri-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) suggest it should be the one for which the analytical expected Hessian is minimized. In practice, the estimator of interest can be derived within a four step procedure. In a rst step the ordered dependent variable is dichotomized into HS B,j it for each possible threshold value j. In a second step Chamberlain's estimator is used choosing one arbitrary threshold value that equally applies to all individuals, let's say j= 3. The predetermined parameter vectorβ j=3 along with the realizations of HS B,j it and X itj for all j ∈ 1, 2, 3, 4 is used to calculate analytically for each individual, which surpasses the corresponding threshold j, the expected Hessian. In a third step, the log-likelihood function L ij for which the analytical expected Hessian is minimized receives the weight w ij = 1 and the corresponding threshold value j i is earmarked. In a last and fourth step the parameter vector of interest is estimated by dichotomizing the ordered variable into HS B,ji it using the individual-specic threshold j i and applying the Chamberlain method. As an approximation one can simply use the within-individual mean values of the health status score as the threshold. This would mean that one constructs for each individual
HS it and collapse the data into binary format:
Using the mean values as cut-o values one loses only those individuals who never change their health status over time 3 .
If one still allows for threshold-specic unobserved heterogeneity α ij , but assumes it to be independent of X it , and category specic parameter vectors β j , we are in the world of a generalized random eects logit (GREL). The individual eect α ij is then integrated out of the loglikelihood by:
If we assume α ij = α j , we are in the world of a generalized ordered logit (GOL). Finally, if we additionally, assume β j = β we are in the world of pooled ordered logit (POL).
Marginal Eects
We calculate the marginal eect of the logarithm of net monthly household equivalent income for each age-specic sub-group, evaluated at the most representative value of the independent variables for each subgroup. For instance, we calculate the marginal eect for a married individual in the age-group 41 to 50, who has two children, who live in the same household, who obtained a ten-year school education and underwent an apprenticeship, and who has the average disposable income of the respective age-group.
The marginal eects for the (ordinal) pooled ordered and generalized ordered logit are programmed according to Cameron and Trivedi (2005, p . 520) and Boes and Winkelmann (2006, p. 12) , respectively.
For calculating the marginal eects for the (binary) conditional xed and random eects we need to make an additional assumption on the distribution of the unobserved eect α ij . One common solution is to set its estimateα ij = 0. In this case the marginal eect is calculated by tting a pooled logit density function multiplied by the coecient of interest:
where j stands for the particular threshold value.
Another solution is to obtainα ij from the generalized conditional xed eects logit. Analytically, the individual xed eect is the mean dierence between the latent health status and the prediction of the dependent variable, evaluated at the mean value of all regressors. We approximate this by: 
where D k is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the individual belongs to the particular agegroup k, and 0 otherwise. The total number of individuals in each age-group is indicated by N k 4 .
Last, to make generalized random eects logit (GREL) marginal eects comparable to those of pooled ordered logit, we have to multiply the GREL coecients β * j with (1 −ρ) (Arulampalan, 1999) 
. 4 A third possibility is to calculate 'pseudo-marginal eects' proposed and implemented by Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004); Frijters et al. (2004a Frijters et al. ( ,b, 2005b . The pseudo marginal eect makes the marginal eect of a variable of interest proportional to the eect of changes in observed health on latent health. It represents the eect of an increase of 1 in a variable with coecient β as an eect ofμβ on latent health. µ estimates the response of observed health satisfaction levels to estimated changes in latent health satisfaction, i.e.: for SAH. However, to make the measure more comparable to the SAH measure that has been widely used in the literature, and to make our results more manageable, we collapse this measure into a ve point scale. For mapping SWH into SAH we use the cumulative distribution functions of the two measures, the cross tabulations of each category and the correlation structure between each sub-category of the two measures. Comparing the cumulative distribution functions 6 for the two variables allows crudely to compare the sum of individuals who report values of SWH up to let's say 2 with the sum of individuals who report a sub-category of SAH, let's say 1.
Looking at the cross-tabulations allows to compare for each sub-category the percentage of individuals who report, let's say SWH= 0 who also report SAH= 1. One can calculate the percentage of overlap for each possible sub-category combination of SWH and SAH. In total, there are 55 pairwise comparisons.
These percentages of overlap can be expressed from the perspective of an individual who reports a subcategory of SWH or SAH. A value of SWH is then mapped into a value of SAH for those pairwise comparisons for which the percentage is the greatest.
Finally, one can look at the sign and the magnitude of the correlations between the 55 possible pairs of comparisons. The strongest positive correlation between two subcategories of the two variables is then used as a guideline for mapping. For example, if the correlation between SWH= 2 and SAH= 1 is stronger (and positive) than any other correlation between SWH= 2 and SAH> 1, then SWH will be recoded to 1. Details of these latter two methods can be found in the Appendix: Coding of Health Satisfaction.
Mapping the lower and the higher values of health satisfaction (value of SWH from 0 to 6 and from 8 to 10) is unambiguous across the three dierent methods of mapping. Ambiguity arises due to the question into which category of SAH SWH= 7 should be merged. We choose the following recoding:
5 Panel Whiz can be accessed via www.panelwhiz.eu. We use plug-ins written by John Haisken-DeNew, Markus Hahn, Mathias Sinning, and Ingo Geishecker. 6 The graph of the cumulative distribution function can be provided upon request by the authors.
• SWH= 0, 1, 2 into SAH= 1 (bad health)
• SWH= 3, 4 into SAH= 2 (poor health)
• SWH= 5, 6 into SAH= 3 (satisfactory health)
• SWH= 7, 8 into SAH= 4 (good health)
• SWH= 9, 10 into SAH= 5 (very good health)
Thus, we proxy health status (HS) by satisfaction with health collapsed into a ve point scale.
As independent variables we include six age categories: from 16 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 60, 61 to 70 and 71 and older. We include these age-groups to test the hypothesis that the inuence of timeinvariant unobserved heterogeneity should become more inuential for older individuals in determining health. Our main variable of interest, socio-economic status, is proxied by household equivalent income.
We construct this variable from net monthly household income and adjust for the household size by dividing this variable by the square root of the number of household members 7 . We interact the income variable with the age-group dummies to obtain a vector of six dierent income coecients. We also include a set of four dummy variables representing educational and professional training. "Secondary schooling" includes those individuals who have less or completed nine years of education and who have no professional education. This category also includes those who have any "other degree", an educational status which refers usually to immigrants. "Intermediate degree" includes those individuals who have at least nine years of schooling and an apprenticeship. "Upper degree" includes those who have thirteen years of schooling and chose an apprenticeship as professional education or those who have ten years of schooling and an advanced professional technical school degree. "University degree" includes all those who obtained a degree from university or a polytechnic.
In addition, we control for immigrant and marital status, the number of household members, geographical location (East versus West Germany) and time eects. Household equivalent income is logtransformed. Last, we separate our sample into men and women to account for the gender specic difference in the relationship between socio-economic status and health. A full description of the variables, their descriptive statistics, and sample sizes can be found in the Data Appendix.
Below, we present the distribution of SWH split by various demographic, socio-economic, and household characteristics. In addition, we display the evolution of health status over time. All graphs are constructed separately for men (left column) and women (right column Whereas, as expected, the number of individuals reporting good health increases the higher the income quintile, we do not nd the same trend for very good health. The number of individuals reporting very good health initially drops for the rst three income quintiles, and then slightly increases for the two highest income quintiles.
A similar phenomenon occurs when looking at education groups as depicted in Figures 4(a) and 4(b).
The higher the educational background of men and women (from left to right), the greater the number of individuals who report good health. The same does not hold true for the highest possible health status when looking at men. Nevertheless, the number of individuals reporting bad health declines the higher the income or the educational background for women and men.
Results
The next two sub-sections show the estimation results for men and women for various models. These models comprise, on the one hand, the pooled ordered logit (POL) and generalized ordered logit (GOL), which both make the assumption of no time-invariant, individual-and health status-specic unobserved heterogeneity and on the other hand, the generalized random eects logit (GREL) and the generalized conditional xed eects logit (GCFEL). The latter both assume the presence of health-status specic time-invariant heterogeneity, but dier in their assumption on the relationship between this heterogeneity and the regressors of the model. Looking at very good self-reported health, we dichotomize the ordered categorical variable into a binary format using the threshold value j= 4 for the GOL, GREL, and GCFEL.
We contrast theses results with those obtained from the conditional ordered xed eects logit (COFEL) that uses the individual means as cut-o values. Last, we simulate the predicted probabilities of reporting very good health over a range of household incomes. Finally, we report also the changes in the probabilities for other health states, namely the probability to exit bad or bad and poor health, or to enter good and very good health for one age-group. Ultimately, we test the robustness of our results with respect to the calculation of the marginal eects, the proxy for health status chosen, and the sample denition.
We report only the marginal eects and their condence intervals for our variable of interest: the logarithm of net monthly household equivalent income for each age-specic sub-group and we present these graphically as box-plots. Age-groups are identied by`Age 1630', for those aged between 16 and 30, up to`Age 71', for those who are 71 years and older. We test the hypothesis of an increasing correlation between the individual xed eect with socio-economic status due to an increase in magnitude of the individual xed eect over time. Therefore, we expect the parameter bias to be greater for older agegroups; the dierence in the parameter coecients between the POL/GOL to the GREL/GCFEL should be no smaller for the older age-groups than for the younger ones.
Box-Plots of Marginal Eects
In Figure 5 is labelled on the righthand vertical axis. We report this marginal eect to illustrate the dierences in conclusions that result from a choice of a threshold value to dichotomize the dependent variable that is driven by statistical rather than by economic considerations.
Consider the marginal eects of income on the probability to report very good health (SWH= 5) for men in Figures 5(a) to 5(f). The POL yields the greatest marginal eect for all age-groups. The eect is largest for age-group 51 to 60 ( Figure 5(d) ): all things being equal, a doubling of log income per month will increase the probability to report very good health by about six-fold 8 . The eect is the smallest for the youngest (0.015, Figure 5(a) ) and the oldest age-group (< 0.03, Figure 5(f) ).
The more we adjust for unobserved heterogeneity and the fewer restrictions we impose on the model, the smaller the eect of a marginal increase of income on the probability to report very good health.
The generalized ordered logit (GOL) model, which relaxes the single index assumption, yields a marginal eect of about 1 to 2 percentage points less than the POL model. The GREL model, which assumes the individual unobserved eect to be independent from income, suggests that a doubling of log income doubles and even triples the probability to report excellent health for the three middle-aged groups (41 to 50, 51 to 60, and 61 to 70, see This last result highlights one important nding in favour of our generalized approach: once the individual xed eect is controlled for, the inuence of observable socio-economic status on very good self-reported health disappears. This decrease is the most extreme for the middle-aged and older groups (41 to 50, 51 to 60, and 61 to 70), but not for the very old ones (71 and older). For these groups the dierence between the marginal eects of income between the POL and GCFEL model varies between 4 to 6 percentage points. The eect is the least extreme for the youngest age-group (16 to 30). This result strengthens our hypothesis that the inuence of the individual xed eect plays a greater role in mediating the relationship between income and health status in older age.
Last, it has to be mentioned that using the conditional ordered xed eects (COFEL) model may yield misleading results when one is interested in the upper bounds of the health distribution. The marginal eect of the COFEL model measures exclusively the impact of a change in income on any change in health status beyond one's own mean. For women a very similar picture emerges as documented in the same in the same gure under W (W=Women), except for the fact that the marginal eect across all possible models is by 1 to 2 percent points smaller than for men.
In Figure 6 we compare the marginal eects for age-group 51 to 60 for the remaining possible changes in health states (thresholds j= 1, j= 2, and j= 3). We choose to illustrate the changes for the middle agegroup, because for this group the marginal impact of an increase in household income on the probability to report very good health has turned out to be the strongest. The box-plots in the left (right) column of Figure 6 represent the marginal eects for men (women). The models in Figure 6 (a) can be interpreted as the eect of a percentage change in income on the probability to exit a bad health status (P(SWH> 1)).
Figure 6(b) depicts the eect of an increase on income on the probability to exit bad and poor health states (P(SWH> 2)). Last, Figure 6 (c) shows the impact of an increase in income on the probability to enter a good or very good health state (P(SWH> 3)). Similarly, as for the models investigating the probability to report very good health, the generalized ordered logit model, an extension of the POL, yields the highest impact of income on any change in health status for both men and women alike. For instance, a doubling of log monthly income for men (women), 15-folds the probability to report good or very good health (13-fold). In contrast, the eects of an increase in income on the probability of exiting bad (and poor) health states are much weaker. A doubling of log monthly income increases the probability to exit the lowest possible health status by four times only (eight times for the two lowest health states). This suggests, in general, that income has a parabolic eect on health: extra income supports individuals to reach higher reported levels of health more eectively than to exit lower reported health states, but levels o again for the highest health status.
Interestingly, once controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with the generalized conditional xed eects (GCFEL) model, the impact of income on health is relatively high for exiting the lower health states (0.07 for both men and women), but equal to zero for the probability to report good or very good health. The marginal impact of a 100 percent increase of log income 4 to 7-fold the probability to exit lower health states. This reveals an important point: the individual xed eect seems to drive the impact of income on entering higher health states, whereas it doesn't for exiting lower health states.
For this middle-aged group the condence intervals of the marginal eects are quite large for changes in the lowest health states in the GCFEL. According to Table 1 , we have only a fth of the original sample of middle-aged individuals that report at least once SWH= 1 (1259 out of originally 5428 individuals).
These smaller sample sizes could be an explanation for greater imprecision, i.e. in terms of the size of condence intervals in the marginal eects. This nding illustrates that the generalized version of the conditional xed can only be used if the original sample size is large enough.
Predicted Probabilities for Reporting Very Good Health
In Figure 7 we present the predicted probabilities to report very good health for the pooled ordered logit (POL), generalized ordered logit (GOL), generalized random eects logit (GREL), and the generalized conditional xed eects logit (GCFEL) model for both men (left column) and women (right column). GREL  7343  6512  6242  5163  3808  2071  GCFEL  1738  2291  2658  2533  1982  1065  SWH > 3  GOL  7343  6512  6242  5163  3808  2071  GREL  7343  6512  6242  5163  3808  2071  GCFEL  3400  3917  3972  3347  2483  1242  SWH > 4  GOL  7343  6512  6242  5163  3808  2071  GREL  7343  6512  6242  5163  3808  2071  GCFEL  4191  3839  3155  2176  1383  609  POL  7508  6724  6532  5428  3952  2143  GOL  7508  6724  6532  5428  3952  2143  SWH > mean  COFEL  5321  5385  5207  4344  3252  1676  SAH > 4  GOL  4910  4877  4531  3936  3194  1664  GREL  4910  4877  4531  3936  3194  1664  GCFEL  2788  3075  2634  2211  1717  834  WOMEN  SWH > 1  GOL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GREL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GCFEL  745  1089  1319  1370  1263  1089  SWH > 2  GOL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GREL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GCFEL  2043  2640  2900  2604  2227  1637  SWH > 3  GOL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GREL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GCFEL  3748  4257  4138  3342  2621  1669  SWH > 4  GOL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GREL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GCFEL  4216  4042  3132  2005  1326  777  POL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  GOL  7416  6735  6317  5048  3992  2942  SWH > mean  COFEL  5460  5672  5370  4315  3472  2369  SAH > 4  POL  4995  5042  4747  3874  3195  2339  GREL  4910  4877  4531  3936  3194  1664  GCFEL  2746  3193  2747  2202  1718  1219 The models are abbreviated as follows: generalized ordered logit (GOL), pooled ordered logit (POL), generalised conditional xed eects logit (GCFEL), generalised random eects logit (GREL), and conditional ordered xed eects logit (COFEL).
We graph the change in reporting probabilities over a range of potential net monthly household incomes from 500 to 5, 500 Euro for men and women separately 10 .
The predicted probabilities for both men and women make it clear that the overall eect of income on health is relatively low. At maximum, giving an extra 5, 000 Euro per month to a poor person raises the probability to report very good health by 0.3 in the POL (Figures 7(a) and 7(b) ), and by 0.4 in the GOL (Figures 7(c) and 7(d) ). This is the case for those aged between 51 and 60, who show the steepest income gradient. The four graphs show that after controlling for individual heterogeneity (Figures 7(g) for men and Figure 7(h) for women) the eect of income on the probability to report very good health fades signicantly. The eect disappears completely for the two youngest age-groups in both models (Age 16 to 30 and Age 31 to 40), and similarly for the age-group of 41 to 50 year-old.
However, all models coincide in their ranking of overall probabilities in reporting very good health for the six age-groups. In all models the youngest age-group has the highest probability, whereas the oldest age-group has the lowest probability. Only for women the GCFEL results in a slightly dierent ranking, in which the oldest age-group faces the second highest probability to report very hood health.
After sweeping out the individual xed eect, the probabilities to report very good health are signicantly lower for all sub-groups. For the older subgroups for both men and women this probability approaches zero. This observation is in line with our hypothesis that the older age-groups should be aected disproportionally from controlling for unobserved heterogeneity.
Last, Figure 8 displays the predicted probabilities of reporting all four health states for age-group 51
to 60 that result from the GOL (Figures 8(a), 8(b) ), the GREL (Figures 8(c), 8(d) ), and the GCFEL (Figures 8(e) , 8(f)). Most interestingly these various probabilities reinforce our ndings from Figure 6(a) to 6(c). The individual xed eect drives the association between health and income for changes into good and very good health, but does not drive it to exit bad or poor health. We nd the same phenomenon for all age-groups, except for the youngest one 11 .
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we test whether our results are robust to changes in the dependent variable, in the calculation of the marginal eects or to the denition of the sample size. In particular, we ask whether we can generalize our results for another proxy of health status, namely self-assessed health (SAH). Then we investigate whether the low magnitude of the marginal eect of income on health in the GCFEL model is caused by setting the individual xed eect equal to zero. Last, we test whether the dierent results 10 To be able to graph the various conditional xed eects models, we approximate the coecients for time-invariant variables, such as the coecient for age-group and education level, with the coecients obtained from the generalized ordered logit. 11 The graphs showing the predicted probabilities of reporting all levels of health for all age-groups will be provided upon request. for the GCFEL model are driven by the smaller sample size required by the conditioning method rather than by controlling for the individual xed eect.
In Figure 10 and 11 we display all marginal eects resulting from these three dierent types of sensitivity analysis for the three youngest and the three oldest age-groups. For the pooled and the generalized ordered logit (POL and GOL, respectively) the graphs show the marginal eects for the full sample (FS) 12 , the smaller sub-sample which uses only observations that are used in the GCFEL (SS), and the regressions that apply self-assessed health as dependent variable (SAH). In addition, we report for the generalized random eects logit (GREL) and the generalized conditional xed eects logit (GCFEL) the alternative marginal eects, which uses an approximation of the estimate of the individual xed eect (ALT).
Since we have already shown that results for men and women are very similar we conduct the sensitivity analysis only for men.
Alternative Measure of Health Status
One may ask whether our polarizing results between the GOL and POL and the GREL and GCFEL may be a particular feature of the satisfaction with health proxy for heath status rather than a general trait of health determination models. One way to test this assertion it to replicate our analysis using self-assessed health (SAH) as dependent variable. As shown in Table 3 and 4 in the Data Appendix, the average value of this variable in the male and female sample is one unit smaller than SWH and it is also only available from 1994 onwards. The latter fact causes the sample shrink to one third from the original sample (see Table 1 , compare row SAH> 4 with SWH> 4). The loss of observations is the greater the younger the age-group.
Looking at Figures 10 and 11 we see the dierence between the original marginal eects (FS) and the estimated marginal eects for changes in the probability to report very good health when using SAH (SAH) turn out to be mixed. In the GREL this latter marginal eect is either the same or slightly bigger than the one under the original model. For the three younger age-groups in the POL and GOL the former holds true (see Figure 10 ), but for the older age-groups the marginal eects are smaller by greater proportions than in the original model (see Figure 11 ). In sharp contrast to these results, again, stands the marginal eects resulting from the GCFEL. In this model the marginal eects are much smaller than the original ones by a magnitude ranging between −.13 and .30 percentage points for the four younger age-groups.
One explanation for this surprising nding could be that the sample sizes for each sub-group are particularly small. With respect to the four youngest age-groups, we lose between 500 to 1000 individuals (Table 1 for age-group 1530 to 5160).
12 These are the original marginal eects reported in Figure 5 .
In light of these insights, we conclude that we can generalize our original results with respect to the health proxy chosen for the younger age-groups in the pooled, generalized and random eects models and for the older age-groups in the generalized conditional xed eects model.
Alternative Marginal Eect Calculation
We may be criticized for making the arbitrary assumption of α ij = 0 when calculating the marginal eects for each age-group and that this assumption drives the low magnitude of the eects in the GREL and the GCFEL. One method to test this hypothesis is to calculate an approximation of the individual, threshold-specic xed eect (from here onwards referred to as IFE) and to plug the mean value of it for each age-group into the formula of the marginal eect. We use the approximation as proposed in equation (18).
Understanding the dimensions of the approximate distribution of the IFE has also the advantage to test its dependence on the covariates of the health determination model. We can test directly, therefore, the hypothesis of no association, which is a necessary condition to apply pooled (ordered) or random eects logit models. Moreover, we regress the threshold-specic IFE on the initial conditions of socio-economic and other control variables to test its correlation with our right-hand side variables. Table 2 reports the results for four regressions. Models (1) to (4) dier with respect to the health status changes made by individuals.
Across models (1) and (3) the IFE is the smallest (or the largest in absolute value) for the oldest agegroups, 71 and older. Since according to equation (6) the IFE is a dierence between the individualspecic health endowment and individual-and threshold specic reporting bias, we cannot interpret these age-group coecients unambiguously. In the case of the older age-groups it is intuitive to argue that they dispose of a worse health endowment due to age-related diseases (Liang et al., 2005) . In the case for younger age-groups, who also dispose of a very small IFE it is more likely that the reporting bias dominates. Younger individuals are expected, given their age, to have a relative good health endowment. One example is age-group 40 to 51 in Models (3) and (4). We would expect individuals of this group to report a lower level of health given their objective health status. A similar argument would hold for the highly educated from the samples of low health states (Models (1) and (2)). For members of this group the IFE is smaller than for any of the groups with a lower level of education. The latent health endowment of this group is, a priori, expected to be high. We nd a reverse direction of the reporting bias for East Germans, who have a higher IFE than West Germans. Unless East Germans do not have a better health endowment 13 , we expect East Germans to over-report their true health level. More important for our analysis is the nding that, at least for Models (2) to (4), the IFE signicantly and positively correlates with household equivalent income and that the correlation is the strongest for the oldest age-group in models (1) to (3). This supports the hypothesis that the inuence of the IFE on individual choices grows for older age-groups (Scarr and McCartney, 1983) . Thus, the bias resulting from wrong model assumptions about the links of unobserved heterogeneity with right-hand side variables would be larger for older age-groups. In sum, these results suggest that the IFE, though nonlinearly, varies substantially across age-groups and strongly correlates with both proxies of socio-economic status. In conjunction with the nding of a non-normally distributed IFE (Figure (18) ), we suggest that the generalized conditional xed eects logit is the preferred model.
Finally, we test whether calculating of the marginal eects with the empirical approximation of the IFE has implications for our conclusions. A close look at the younger age-groups in Figure 10 and 11 shows that the alternatively calculated marginal eects (ALT) for the GREL and the GCFEL yields no changes vis-a-vis the original marginal eect (FS). Even though we observe a change in marginal eects for the older age-groups, this dierence is limited to 1 to 2 percentage points. These dierences for the older age-groups are expected, as we have shown in Table 2 that the assumption of a zero IFE is the least tenable for the older age-groups.
We conclude from this sensitivity analysis that the low magnitude of the marginal eects in the GREL and GCFEL models do not result from the arbitrary assumption thatα ij = 0. It may be used with no concerns for the younger age-groups.
Smaller Sub-samples
Finally, we may hypothesise that the small marginal eects of the GCFEL are the result of the small sample sizes which the method yields rather than of the control for unobserved heterogeneity. The idea here is that the sample is a highly self-selected group of individuals who, on the one hand, exhibit sucient variation in self-reported health and on the other hand report, at least once, a very good health status. Table 1 indicates that these self-selected samples in the GCFEL for j= 4 are about one-third (younger groups) to two-thirds (older groups) smaller than in the full sample. In the light of this sample selection argument, the small marginal eects identied in the GCFEL for the highest possible health status could be driven by dierent mean values of the independent variables and unobserved heterogeneity. One way to test this hypothesis is to repeat our analysis for the pooled ordered logit (POL), the generalized ordered logit (GOL), and the generalized random eects logit (GREL) by using the sample of the GCFEL that results for changes into the highest possible health status. If the marginal eects for the POL, GOL and the GREL are then similar to those of the GCFEL, or at least much smaller, we would interpret this nding in favour of the sample selection hypothesis. Figures 10 and 11 show the small sample marginal eects (SS).
What we nd striking is that for all age-groups the smaller sub-samples yield a larger marginal eect (SS) than for the original marginal eect that uses the full sample (FS). This nding holds true for all models, except for the POL in the case of age-group 41 to 50. In particular, the dierence sums up to a maximum of 4 percentage points for all age-groups in the GOL and to 1 to 2 percentage points in the POL and GREL models.
Thus, we do not nd evidence of the hypothesis that the small marginal eects that result from the GCFEL model are driven by the selected, smaller sample sizes.
However, this does not hold true when looking at the marginal changes in the probabilities to exit bad or poor health or entering good or very good health. We illustrate these dierences in Figures 12(a) , 12(b) and 12(c) for age-group 51 to 60. In these three cases the marginal eects of income on the respective probabilities (SS) for both the GOL and the GREL model are smaller than those from the full sample (FS) by a magnitude ranging between 1 to 5 percentage points. Despite these smaller magnitudes, these marginal eects still don't resemble those yielded by the GCFEL model. These are highly negative for the two probabilities of exiting the lower tail of the health distribution. Figure 12 : Sensitivity analysis, men only and for age-group 51 to 60
We, therefore conclude that the large dierences in the marginal eects of income on health status are mainly driven by the individual, threshold-specic eect and not by a particular sample selection.
Conclusions
We investigate whether the assumptions imposed on the relationship between unobserved heterogeneity and socio-economic status in assessing self-assessed health makes any practical dierence. To illustrate our point we estimate a model of health satisfaction using 22 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel and collapsing the eleven-point measure into a ve-point scale analogous to self-assessed health.
We propose a generalized conditional xed eects logit (GCFEL) model that allows a heterogeneous impact of income on health while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. By imposing various restrictions on this general formulation, we compare the relative performance of pooled and generalized ordered logits (POL and GOL), generalized random eects logit (GREL), and the conditional ordered xed effects logit (COFEL) with the GCFEL. The main variable of interest is the log of net monthly household equivalent income which we interact with six age-group specic dummies. Estimating the marginal eect of income on the probability to report very good health for various age-groups reects the hypothesis that the unobserved individual heterogeneity that proxies personality traits, intelligence or genetic endowment, has a growing importance in determining health outcomes in older age. Therefore, we expect that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity may reveal greater dierences vis-à-vis models that do not for an older sub-sample.
We nd that not controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (POL and GOL) yields a marginal eect that is signicantly greater than those yielded by models that consider its presence in the data (GREL and GCFEL). When allowing for correlation between the individual xed eect and household income the marginal eect approaches zero for all age-groups and this eect is the same for men and women alike. Under the assumption of no correlation between the individual xed eects and income (GREL), the magnitude of the marginal eect lies half-way between the POL, GOL and the GCFEL. For the middle-aged groups a doubling of the log of disposable income leads to a relatively large increase of 4 to 6 times in the probability to report very good health. Accordingly, the marginal eect yielded by the the GOL and the GREL are smaller than this upper bound, but strictly greater than zero.
The dierences in the magnitude of the marginal eects across the pooled and the xed eects models are the strongest for the older age-groups. This nding supports our hypothesis that controlling for the potential correlation between the xed eect and income is the more important the older an individual is.
In older age the xed eect correlates stronger with socio-economic status. To this extent the expected bias of unobserved heterogeneity, when not accounted for, is greater for these groups.
Taking our analysis further to assessing other health states we nd two interesting phenomena: First, the model that does not account for unobserved heterogeneity (GOL) yields the highest marginal eect.
However, the magnitude of this eect is heterogeneous across health states: doubling the log of monthly income will ve-fold the probability of exiting a bad health status, whereas it nearly 15-folds the probability to report higher levels of health status. Our results are in line with Boes and Winkelmann (2006) who nd varying marginal eects of income on the dierent levels of general life satisfaction. To this extent we are also able to show that the Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004) proposal, that looks at changes across health changes beyond one's individual mean, is too a narrow focus given the heterogeneity of income eects on health.
Second, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and, therefore, allowing for its potential correlation with income, the marginal eect is no longer equal to zero for exiting the lower health states. This suggests that the individual xed eect does mediate the relationship between income and changes in higher health outcomes, but not between income and changes in lower health outcomes.
Last, our sensitivity checks ensure that our results are neither driven by the particular choice of proxy for heath status, nor by the arbitrary assumption of setting the individual xed eect equal to zero when computing the marginal eects, nor by the self-selected samples incurred by the conditional xed eects logit approach. By approximating the individual xed eect we learn that the arbitrary assumptions on normality and orthogonality of the individual xed eect made in the random eects logit are not tenable.
The GCFEL is the preferred model. Nevertheless, the GCFEL suers from the potential drawback that we are forced to discard many observations for assessing the probability of reporting the upper and lower bounds of health satisfaction. This becomes evident when we use the alternative proxy for health status, self-assessed health, in which we have data only for a panel of 12 years. Given the constant growth of panel datasets, we believe sample sizes will be of smaller concern to researchers in the future.
Appendix: Coding of Health Satisfaction
In Figure 13 we present the cross-correlations between the various sub-categories of satisfaction with health (SWH) coded from 0 to 10 and the various sub-categories of self-assessed health (SAH) coded from 1 to 5. The horizontal axis scales the value of the corresponding sub-category of the both measures.
In Figure 13(a) we displayed values of SWH from 0 to 6 and of SAH from 1 to 3. In Figure 13 In Figure 13 (c) we crudely graph the same tetrachord correlations in three-dimensional space. On the vertical axis we graph ρ, the degree of correlation between two possible combinations of sub-categories of SWH and SAH. On the two horizontal axes we graph satisfaction with health (left axis) and self-assessed health (right axis). Small values for both SWH and SAH run from left to right of each axis. A closer look allows to notice that the correlations (high vertical lines) occur where high ( In Tables 3 and 4 we report the descriptive statistics for the measures of subjective health status, SWH, SAH, and WAH, and the set of independent variables for men and women, respectively. In the bottom two rows of each table we report the number of individuals and person-year observations for each age-group.
Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
Sample sizes, both in total and for the age-specic subgroups, are approximately the same for both men and women. In total, we have more than 20, 000 individuals in each group. For the age-specic subgroups, the youngest group aged 16 to 30 is largest in size with nearly 7, 500 individuals, and the oldest age-group is the smallest with less than 3, 000 individuals. On average, individuals remain in the panel for seven years.
All three measures of subjective health are decreasing in age, whereas the smallest variation in the mean value is reported for WAH. This is a common phenomenon encountered for measures with small units on a Likert scale. Across all age-group individuals report a value of SAH≈ 2.7 and WAH≈ 2.1, and SWH≈ 3.6). Average household equivalent income ranges from approximately 1, 200 Euro per month for the youngest age-group to approximately 1, 350 Euro per month for the oldest age-group. Individuals from the age-group 51 to 60 have the highest average household income, which illustrates growing income over the life-cycle before retirement, when income falls again. The unemployment data reects the longterm situation in the German labour market, in so far as these are the averages taken over the past 22 years. Individuals above the age of 50 face the highest risk of being unemployed (≈ 12 percent), followed by the youngest age-group (≈ 8 percent). 
